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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provide that
privileged information is beyond the scope of discovery.' There-
fore, in response to an adversary's request for production,2 an at-
torney need not surrender a document that satisfies the require-
ments of the attorney-client privilege.3 Problems may arise,
however, if an attorney accidentally produces a privileged docu-
ment. These problems occur because one of the elements necessary
to assert the attorney-client privilege is proof that neither the at-
* Associate with the firm of Steel, Hector & Davis, Miami, Florida; B.A., J.D., Univer-
sity of Florida.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged .... ").
2. Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs requests for production.
3. Judge Wyzanski, in his often-quoted language in United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), sets out these requirements:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
,(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
89 F. Supp. at 358-59. An equally well established statement of the requirements for the
privilege is Dean Wigmore's eight part test, 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2292, at 554 (rev. ed. 1961), which four circuits have adopted. See United States v.
Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320
F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 567 F. Supp. 1357, 1360
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Second Circuit.Court of Appeals decisions).
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torney nor the client has waived the privilege.4 Because a waiver
may be effected by implication, 5 inadvertent production of a privi-
leged document may constitute an implied waiver of the privilege.
This article addresses the problem of implied waiver through
inadvertent disclosure from two perspectives. First, the article dis-
cusses relevant case law and recommends an approach courts
should take to the problem. Second, in order to prevent a court
from finding an implied waiver,' this article suggests procedures a
lawyer should follow when he receives a privileged document, and
when a privileged party inadvertently discloses the contents of a
privileged document.
I. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES
Two schools of thought exist on implied waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege through inadvertent disclosure of privileged
documents. Some courts examine the conduct of the disclosing
lawyer to determine whether an implied waiver has occurred. This
"conduct analysis" approach is a recent trend. Other courts invoke
a standard of strict responsibility, finding an implied waiver where
"fairness," both to the party asserting the privilege and to the
4. See Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25
(9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th
Cir. 1975) (citation omitted).
5. See Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24
(9th Cir. 1981); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1125 (1975); United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing 8 J.
WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2327, at 637-38 (rev. ed. 1961)), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971);
United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing IBM v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 652
(M.D. Fla. 1977).
6. This article addresses only the problems presented by inadvertent disclosure and
does not consider the separate and distinct problem of involuntary disclosure. Inadvertent
disclosure involves divulgence of privileged information due to unilateral error by the party
asserting the privilege. Involuntary disclosure, however, involves compelled or otherwise
wrongfully obtained disclosure of privileged information due to the actions of a third party.
See Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(distinguishing between inadvertent and involuntary disclosure). Although cases sometimes
contain elements of both inadvertent and involuntary disclosure, see, e.g., Transamerica
Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978) (characterizing counsel's accidental dis-
closure of privileged documents as involuntary because, in effect, the court's unduly rigid
discovery schedule compelled disclosure), in most cases these concepts are distinguishable.
Compare Donovan v. Robbins, No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 1983) (privi-
leged memorandum inadvertently included among documents produced due to miscom-
munication between co-counsel) with United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., Trade Cas. (CCH)
T 67,883 (S.D. Ohio 1954) (where government agents came on defendant's premises demand-
ing to inspect files and defendant permitted inspection, there was no voluntary waiver of the
attorney-client privilege; "[t]here [was] at least implied coercion .... ").
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party seeking discovery, requires this result. In practice, the "strict
responsibility standard" is beginning to resemble the conduct anal-
ysis approach.
A. The Conduct Analysis Approach
The most cogent line of cases using the conduct analysis ap-
proach comes from the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois. In Donovan v. Robbins,7 the court faced a
clear case of inadvertent disclosure. Due to a miscommunication
between defense counsel, a memorandum memorializing certain
communications between a defendant and his lawyer was inadver-
tently included among the documents produced to the plaintiff.
Defense counsel discovered this error when the plaintiff subse-
quently attached a copy of the memorandum to a deposition as an
exhibit. Defense counsel immediately terminated the deposition
and obtained a protective order that sealed the memorandum and
required the return of all copies pending the district court's ruling
on the implied waiver issue.
The defendant then moved the district court for a protective
order to continue the seal on the memorandum. The court re-
soundingly rejected plaintiff's contention that inadvertent disclos-
ure of the memorandum destroyed its privileged status and
granted defendant's motion for a protective order. The court
stated:
[W]e have no hesitation in concluding that, where disclosure of
an otherwise privileged communicatin [sic] was obviously acci-
dental and occurred in a setting where appropriate precautions
had been taken and where prompt objection was made after the
disclosure, there has been no waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege with respect to the disclosed document. This is the only po-
sition consistent with the hornbook notion that a waiver is a vol-
untary relinquishment of a known right.8
The voluntariness requirement was the basis of an earlier deci-
sion from the same judicial district, which expressly held that in-
advertent disclosure was not "the 'intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.'" In Mendenhall v. Barber-
7. No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Il1. Nov. 14, 1983).
8. Id. at 6-8.
9. Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (quoting
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
1985]
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Greene Co., 10 plaintiff's counsel accidentally permitted defense
counsel to review privileged letters while defense counsel was ex-
amining documents in the offices of plaintiff's counsel. When de-
fendant's counsel requested copies of the letters, plaintiff's counsel
realized his mistake and refused to release them. Defense counsel
then moved to compel production of the letters,1" arguing that the
plaintiff had impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege. The
court rejected defendant's argument and found that accidental dis-
closure was insufficient to satisfy the generally accepted require-
ments for an effective waiver. The court stated: "We are taught
from first year law school that waiver imports the 'intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right.' Inadvertent pro-
duction is the antithesis of that concept."12 The court, therefore,
found that the plaintiff had not waived the attorney-client privi-
lege and denied defense counsel's motion to compel.' 3
An analysis of the Donovan and Mendenhall decisions, and
the cases upon which they rely, reveals the three key factors that a
court considers under the conduct analysis approach. First, the
court determines whether the disclosure was actually accidental.'
Presumably, a court would not deem any deliberate attempt to
gain an advantage through full or partial disclosure"5 to be "acci-
10. 531 F. Supp. 951.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) governs motions to compel.
12. 531 F. Supp. at 955 (footnote omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938)).
13. Id.
14. Donovan, No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 2-3; see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D.
508, 519 (D. Conn. 1976) (where counsel had excised the privileged portion of a communica-
tion from a document in the initial production, subsequent failure to edit later production
due to en masse copying was clearly inadvertent; no implied waiver.
15. Partial disclosure refers to the disclosure of a selected portion of a privileged docu-
ment or divulgence of a single privileged document where a group of privileged documents
exist on the same subject matter. Under these circumstances partial disclosure may misrep-
resent the true character of the privileged communication. This danger of misrepresentation
is the basis for the rule that voluntary disclosure of a portion of a privileged communication
constitutes a waiver with respect to the rest of the communication on the same subject. See
R. J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 87 F.R.D. 358, 359 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (citing Securi-
ties & Exch. Comm'n v. Dresser Indus., 453 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1978); see also Handgards,
Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976); International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973). The purpose of this rule "is to
prevent a litigant from 'insisting upon the protection of the privilege for damaging commu-
nications while disclosing other selected communications because they are self-serving.'"
Marshall v. United States Postal Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980); cf. Lee Nat'l Corp.
v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 1970) (where deponent disclosed that he con-
ferred with counsel regarding a specific subject matter on certain occasions, fairness re-




dental.' 6 Second, if the disclosure is deemed accidental, the court
examines the precautions the attorney took to assert and protect
the privilege.17 For example, distinguishing the document from
non-privileged documents by marking it,' separating it from the
bulk of materials,' 9 or creating a list of privileged documents ° evi-
dences some attempt to protect the privilege. Finally, the court
considers the steps the attorney took to reassert and protect the
privilege upon discovery of the inadvertent disclosure." An attor-
ney's delay in reasserting the privilege and seeking the document's
return can be fatal. The cases indicate that immediate remedial
action is necessary to avoid an implied waiver of the privilege. If
each of these three criteria is met, the court will not imply a waiver
of the privilege and may issue a protective order that requires the
opposing party to return the document and all copies of the docu-
ment, and prevents the opposing party from disclosing the con-
tents of the document or using the document at trial."
B. The Strict Responsibility Standard
Professor Wigmore, a leading authority in this area, advocates
16. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Investigation of Ocean Transp., 1980-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) T 63,195 (D.D.C. May 2, 1979) (distinguishing inadvertent disclosure from
the situation "where an attorney is attempting, through partial disclosure, to use the privi-
lege offensively"); see also Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 992 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) ("[Tlhis Court will not countenance defendants' attempt to affirmatively use their
carelessness to recover a privilege once lost.").
17. Donovan, No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 2-3; see Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-
Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[Tjhe relevant consideration is the intent
of the [parties asserting the privilege] to maintain the confidentiality of the documents as
manifested in the precautions they took." Thus the privilege will not be applied to docu-
ments found in a garbage can.); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir.
1984) (quoting In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 & n.10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867
(1973) ("[I]f a client wishes to preserve the privilege . . . he must take some affirmative
action to preserve confidentiality. . . . Taking or failing to take precautions may be consid-
ered as bearing on intent to preserve confidentiality"); see also Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern,
598 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co.,
15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954)) ("One measure of [a document's] continuing confiden-
tiality is the degree of care exhibited in [its] keeping, and the risk of insufficient precautions
must rest with the party claiming the privilege.").
18. E.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.)
(privileged documents marked with the letter "p"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
19. E.g., Donovan, No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 2-3.
20. E.g., Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 765 (1977) (materials
claimed to be privileged were listed on separate document).
21. See Donovan, No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 3-4.
22. See Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 765 (1977) (granting mo-
tion for protective order requiring the return, non-disclosure, and non-use in evidence of
privileged documents inadvertently disclosed).
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the strict responsibility standard for implied waiver through inad-
vertent disclosure. He maintains a rigid standard for accidental
actions:
A privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his in-
tention not to abandon could alone control the situation. There
is always also the objective consideration that when his conduct
touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that his
privilege shall cease whether he intended that result or not.2
Although Professor Wigmore's position has influenced some deci-
sions in this area,24 the trend is for courts to retreat from the strict
responsibility standard.2 5 The most scathing attack on the Wig-
more view came from the Mendenhall court which relied on a Su-
preme Court approved proposed Federal Rule of Evidence."0 The
proposed rule provided that a communication was confidential un-
less "intended to be disclosed. '27 Although Congress did not adopt
this Rule, the court found the Rule's intent test more instructive
than the strict responsibility standard 2s and concluded that "[f]or
23. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327, at 636 (rev. ed. 1961);
see also E. CLEARY, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 93, at 194 (2d ed.
1972).
24. Numerous courts have quoted this passage when discussing this area of the law.
See, e.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th
Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D.
160, 173-74 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp.
1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
25. See, e.g., Report of Committee of Department of Justice at 23 (1971), quoted in 2 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 511[01] (1982) (recommending amend-
ment to FED. R. EVID. 511) ("The proper test [for implied waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege] should grant the judge flexibility to assess all the circumstances surrounding the dis-
closure; in that way he can evaluate the primary issue whether disclosure is compatible with
the existence of the privilege."). Id. at 511-13.
26. 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8.
27. Rule 503(a)(4) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence provides in full:
A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third per-
sons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of
professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication.
FED. R. EvID. 503(a)(4) (emphasis added). Curiously, the Mendenhall court relied only on
Rule 503 and did not even mention Rule 511. See 531 F. Supp. at 955. Proposed Rule 511,
which was also approved by the Supreme Court but not enacted by Congress, provides that
a privilege is waived if the holder "voluntarily discloses or consents to disclose any signifi-
cant part of the matter." FED. R. EvID. 511. At least one commentator has stated that
"[s]tandard 511 does not limit waiver to those instances where the holder intentionally re-
linquishes a known right." 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE V 511[02]
(1982). See infra note 50.
28. The court relied upon an earlier decision from the same judicial district, Suburban
[Vol. 39:511
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this Court the Wigmore doctrine is atavistic, generating (in much
the same way as a flawed pleading in the era of common law plead-
ing) harsh results out of proportion to the mistake of inadvertent
disclosure."29
Despite the Mendenhall court's strong language, the conduct
analysis approach and strict responsibility standard do not differ
significantly in practice. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Woodall,30 noted the components of the Wigmore
standard:
[W]aiver by implication involves two basic elements. The first is
subjective-Does the person holding the right to claim the privi-
lege intend to waive it? The second element is objective-Is it
fair and consistent with the assertion of the claim or defense
being made to allow the privilege to be invoked? This objective
determination should be based upon whether ... fairness re-
quires the privilege shall cease even when, subjectively, he never
intended that result.
The Fifth Circuit's bifurcation of the Wigmore test into sub-
jective and objective elements helps to illuminate the similarity be-
tween the strict responsibility standard and the conduct analysis
approach. First, by requiring the court to consider whether "the
person holding the right to claim the privilege intend[ed] to waive
it,"31 the strict responsibility standard conforms to the first ele-
ment of the conduct analysis approach-whether the disclosure
Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981), in which
"Judge Leighton accurately describes the Rule, though not ultimately adopted by Congress,
as 'providing valuable standards for the courts.'" 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8 (quoting Subur-
ban, 91 F.R.D. at 259.
29. 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8.
30. United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
933 (1971). Although Woodall did not involve inadvertent disclosure, lower courts have ex-
tended its interpretation of Wigmore to inadvertent disclosure cases. See, e.g., Champion
Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. Ga. 1980); see also In
re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 605 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (applying Woodall test to document
production).
The Eighth Circuit has articulated a two-part inquiry similar to the Woodall formula-
tion. See Sedco Int'l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017
(1982) ("In determining whether there has been an implied waiver, two elements must be
examined: (1) implied intention and (2) fairness and consistency.").
31. 438 F.2d at 1324. Other cases also indicate that the subjective intent of the party
asserting the privilege is one factor to be considered pursuant to the Wigmore test. See Weil
v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)
(citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327, at 636); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1974).
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was truly accidental.2 Second, the objective fairness element of the
strict responsibility standard is comparable to the second and
third components of the conduct analysis approach: whether "fair-
ness requires the privilege shall cease ' 33 is in many cases deter-
mined by whether "disclosure of an otherwise privileged communi-
catin [sic] . . . occurred in a setting where appropriate precautions
had been taken and where prompt objection was made after the
disclosure.
3 4
The court's analysis in In re Grand Jury Investigation of
Ocean Transportation demonstrates the similarity between the
two approaches. 35 In that case, the defendant's original counsel re-
sponded to a government subpoena on September 30, 1976, by pro-
ducing two groups of documents. Counsel did not assert a privilege
as to the first group of documents. Counsel did, however, mark the
second group of documents with a ",P.",36 Suspecting that "P"
meant "privileged" and that counsel had not intended to produce
the marked documents, the government promptly asked counsel
whether he had disclosed the documents by mistake. Counsel in-
vestigated and explicitly, though mistakenly, advised the govern-
ment that he had intended to disclose the documents and that he
did not claim any privilege.
3 7
In March 1977, almost six months later, counsel realized the
mistake and told the government that a formal demand for the
documents' return would be forthcoming. No such demand was
made, however, until early 1978-almost one and a half years after
the inadvertent disclosure-after defendant retained new coun-
sel. 8 During this period, the government used the documents in
conjunction with the grand jury investigation and in questioning
witnesses.39
The Ocean Transportation court applied the Wigmore stan-
dard and held that the defendant had waived the privilege. The
court made clear, however, that its decision was grounded upon the
facts of the particular case:
Perhaps [the Wigmore] rule should not be strictly applied to all
32. See supra text accompanying note 16.
33. Woodall, 438 F.2d at 1324.
34. Donovan, No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 6-7.
35. 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
36. Id. at 674.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 674-75.
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cases of unknown or inadvertent disclosure; this, however, is not
a case where any such exception would be appropriate. Here, the
disclosure cannot be viewed as having been inadvertent in all
respects. Original counsel knew that some papers marked "P"
had been divulged. This production was brought to their atten-
tion on at least one occasion; each time, however, said counsel
declined to assert the privilege. . . ; and there certainly was
here an adequate opportunity in September 1976 [when the gov-
ernment first notified defense counsel] to claim the privilege.
Most importantly, it would be unfair and unrealistic now to
permit the privilege's assertion as to these documents which
have been thoroughly examined and used by the Government
for several years. The Government attorneys' minds cannot be
expunged, the grand jury is familiar with the documents, and'
various witnesses' testimony regarding the papers has been
heard. This is not a case of mere inadvertence where the breach
of confidentiality can be easily remedied. Here, the disclosure
cannot be cured simply by a return of the documents. The privi-
lege has been permanently destroyed.
40
In finding an implied waiver under the strict responsibility
standard, the court in Ocean Transportation actually focused on
the elements of the third requirement of the conduct analysis ap-
proach-whether counsel took prompt remedial action. The cir-
cumstances that made it "unfair and unrealistic . . . to permit the
privilege's assertion" '41 flowed from counsel's delay in reasserting
the privilege and from his failure to promptly seek the documents'
return. Such conduct does not constitute prompt remedial action
and would result in an implied waiver even under the conduct
analysis approach.
An examination of a landmark strict responsibility case, Un-
derwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,42 further dem-
onstrates the similarity between the two approaches. In that case,
the plaintiff corporation gave its attorney numerous documents to
be produced. Among these documents was a privileged letter sent
from a patent attorney to the president of the corporation. Pursu-
ant to a consent order, plaintiff's counsel produced the privileged
40. Id. at 675 (citations omitted). The court also observed that "the Government can-
not be said in any way to have 'compelled' [defendant) or original counsel to produce privi-
leged documents .... Id. In noting that the government did not "compel" disclosure, the
Ocean Transportation court appears to recognize the distinction between involuntary and
inadvertent disclosure. See supra note 6.
41. Id. at 675.
42. 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970).
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letter for the defendant's examination. When the defendant at-
tempted to depose the patent attorney concerning the letter, the
attorney refused to respond, basing his refusal on the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. The defendant then moved to compel answers to
questions concerning the letter.
The plaintiff resisted the motion to compel, arguing that the
production of the letter was inadvertent and involuntary. In
sweeping language, the court found this position "untenable":
The plaintiff turned over to his attorney the documents to be
produced. This letter was among them. The Court will not look
behind this objective fact to determine whether the plaintiff re-
ally intended to have the letter examined. . . . Once the docu-
ment was produced for inspection, it entered the public domain.
Its confidentiality was breached thereby destroying the basis for
the continued existence of the privilege.
. . . Any privilege that may have attached to the document
was destroyed by the voluntary act of disclosure.4
At first blush, the Underwater court appears to establish an abso-
lute rule that inadvertent disclosure results in an implied waiver of
the attorney-client privilege. A crucial fact, however, prevents one
from drawing such a broad conclusion: neither the plaintiff nor the
plaintiff's counsel made any pre-disclosure effort to assert and pro-
tect the privilege whatsoever. In terms of the conduct analysis ap-
proach, the plaintiff made no effort to assert the privilege prior to
disclosure and took absolutely no precautions to prevent disclosure
of the privileged information. Thus, the conduct analysis approach
would yield the same result.
A subsequent case interpreting Underwater supports the view
that the basis of the Underwater decision was the absence of any
attempt to assert the privilege and the failure to take adequate
precautions to protect the document's confidentiality. In W. R.
Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc.,"" the court cited the Underwater
decision to support an implied waiver based on the pre-disclosure
conduct of defendant's counsel.45 Plaintiff had served a request for
production of documents and in a written response accompanying
the documents, defendant's counsel stated that he had produced
all documents within the scope of the request and that he had at-
tempted to remove all privileged documents. Defendant's counsel
43. Id. at 549 (citation omitted).
44. 446 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
45. See id. at 775.
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further stated, however, that "it is possible that some . ..privi-
leged . . documents remain among those which will be pro-
duced." 6 Defendant's counsel did, in fact, produce some privileged
documents. He then attempted to assert the privilege as to the
specific documents in question. He argued that his response to
plaintiff's request reserved defendant's right to later assert the
privilege with respect to any documents produced.4 7
The court found such a general reservation of rights inade-
quate to preserve the attorney-client privilege. The court found
that defendant's counsel had over four months to review the re-
quested documents and that defendant's counsel had in fact re-
moved privileged documents from one of the four categories of
documents involved in the case. Thus, the court deemed the reser-
vation in defendant's response a nullity and held that the defen-
dant had waived the privilege with respect to the documents he
had produced.' 8
Although the Underwater and W. R. Grace decision purport
to rely solely on the objective fact of disclosure, their true focus is
on the objectively inadequate pre-disclosure precautions taken by
the party that attempts to assert the attorney-client privilege. In
Underwater, the plaintiff made no attempt to assert the privilege
until after defendant's counsel attempted to depose the author of
the privileged letter. Similarly, in W. R. Grace, the defendant
made only the bald assertion that he had attempted to exclude
privileged documents and that he had reserved the right to assert
the privilege at a later time. In either case, there was no objective,
competent evidence that indicated that, before disclosing the docu-
ment, the party asserting the privilege recognized that the docu-
ment was privileged and intended to withhold that specific docu-
ment from production. As such, these cases are, on their facts,
completely compatible with the conduct analysis approach require-
ments that the party asserting the privilege take pre-disclosure
precautions to protect confidentiality and assert the privilege in a
timely manner.' 9 Thus, as the Ocean Transportation, Underwater
and W. R. Grace decisions reveal, the conduct analysis approach
and the strict responsibility standard, when applied properly and
reasoned thoroughly, turn upon similar facts and produce similar
46. Id. at 774 n.4.
47. Id. at 774.
48. Id. at 775.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
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results.50
50. The similarity between the two approaches is further demonstrated by the district
court's disposition of the Ocean Transportation case after remand. In determining the
scope of the waiver, the court relied on the first factor of the conduct analysis approach:
whether the disclosure was accidental. The inadvertency of the disclosure clearly influenced
the court:
The Court reiterates its finding that this is an instance of inadvertent disclosure
and not a case where an attorney is attempting, through partial disclosure, to
use the privilege offensively. Thus, the waiver must be construed as limited to
the specific subject as it is a part of the particular documents previously dis-
closed. This narrow construction will best serve the objectives of the attorney
client privilege and promote the fairness the subject matter waiver principle is
designed to serve.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings of Ocean Transp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,195 (D.D.C.
1979). Thus, notwithstanding egregious neglect by defense counsel, the court fashioned a
very narrow disclosure order. See also First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86
F.R.D. 160 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (finding a waiver under the Wigmore test but limiting the scope
of the waiver to documents already produced because the party asserting the privilege in no
way benefited from disclosure).
While the conduct analysis approach and strict responsibility standard are clearly the
predominate approaches, a third possible approach to the implied waiver problem is con-
tained in Supreme Court Standard 511. Although this standard was not adopted by Con-
gress and speaks in terms of "involuntary" rather than "inadvertent" disclosure, see supra
note 6, it is arguably relevant to cases of inadvertent disclosure. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE V 511[02] n.15a (Supp. 1984) (noting parenthetically that the
Mendenhall court failed to cite Standard 511 in an inadvertent disclosure case). As ap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court in 1969 and as amended in 1971, Standard 511
provides as follows:
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of a confi-
dential matter or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor
while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any
significant part of the matter or communication. This rule does not apply if the
disclosure is itself a privileged communication.
FED. R. EvID. 511. One possible interpretation of Standard 511 is that any voluntary disclos-
ure, regardless of the circumstances, results in a waiver of the privilege. Indeed, the United
States Department of Justice apparently has adopted this view. See Report of Committee of
Department of Justice 37-38 (1971), quoted in 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's
EVIDENCE $ 511[01] (1982). (Standard 511 "would necessitate the finding of waiver every
time the holder of a privilege is shown to have voluntarily disclosed a significant part of the
privileged matter, except when such disclosure is made during the communications that are
also privileged.") Dissatisfied with what it considered to be an unduly harsh and narrow
test, the Department recommended that Standard 511 be amended to limit waiver to situa-
tions where the involuntary disclosure occurred "under such circumstances that it would be
inappropriate to allow the claim of privilege." Id. at 511-13. The Department believed that
this amendment would give the courts a desirable degree of flexibility when ruling on im-
plied waiver by permitting them to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the invol-
untary disclosure. Id.
While the proposed amendment was not adopted, Standard 511 may not be as strict a
standard as the Justice Department assumed. At least one distinguished commentator has
suggested that Standard 511 in its present form already grants the courts flexibility to con-
sider the circumstances attending the disclosure. Id. at 511-14. The lack of judicial interpre-
tation of Standard 511, however, leaves the matter open to speculation. In any event, Stan-
dard 511 is, at best, an attempt to codify the Wigmore fairness standard; at worst, it is a
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II. RECOMMENDED JUDICIAL APPROACH
Although the conduct analysis approach and the strict respon-
sibility standard have significant similarities, the former approach
contains distinct advantages. These advantages, clarity and ease of
application, stem from two facts. First, the explicitness of the
three-pronged test of the conduct analysis approach makes it a
more precise approach than the strict responsibility standard's
nebulous "fairness" test. Second, the conduct analysis approach is
easier to apply because its three-part test is better suited to the
problem of an attorney's inadvertent disclosure of a document dur-
ing discovery than is the fairness test. This second point requires
some explanation. Most of the cases cited by Wigmore in support
of his strict responsibility theory involved oral assertions by a cli-
ent that made his confidential communications a material issue in
a judicial proceeding. As one court noted, this presents "circum-
stances in which it would be patently unfair to uphold a claim of
privilege." 51 In cases involving disclosure by attorneys, however,
the privileged information is usually divulged during discovery and
is revealed only to opposing counsel.52 Thus, the unfairness in find-
ing no waiver in this situation is frequently not "patent." The con-
duct analysis approach serves as a useful analytical tool to deter-
mine what is fair based on the facts of a case.
Several benefits flow from the clarity and ease of application
of the conduct analysis approach. The results under the conduct
analysis approach are easier to predict than those under the strict
responsibility standard. Under the former approach, counsel knows
that he must satisfy three specific criteria to prevent the court
from finding an implied waiver through inadvertent disclosure. By
comparison, the strict responsibility standard contains objective
and subjective components,5 3 but the subjective "fairness" compo-
nent is too vague to provide a standard by which counsel can confi-
dently gauge the consequences of inadvertent disclosure. Consider-
ing the impact a single privileged document could have on a case,
the ability to predict the court's ruling on the waiver issue is im-
portant, particularly in those cases where the parties are engaged
harsh rule of strict responsibility permitting no inquiry into surrounding circumstances.
51. United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862 & n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing Wig-
more in support of the characterization of the implied waiver case law).
52. See id. at 862.
53. See United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 933 (1971).
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in settlement negotiations. 5'
The conduct analysis approach is more likely to produce fair
and uniform judicial decisions because the results are easier to pre-
dict. Courts that do not employ the three-part test of the conduct
analysis approach sometimes find an implied waiver without thor-
oughly analyzing the facts.5 Such an approach may lead to arbi-
trary decisions and unfair results. By providing a concrete test to
assist courts in their analysis of the problem, the conduct analysis
approach helps minimize unfairness and arbitrariness. Any device
that facilitates the courts' inquiry into the circumstances of the
disclosure will promote fairness. Further, if courts employ the
same precise standards to analyze the facts of each case, then the
results in different cases will become more reconcilable.
Finally, the clarity and ease of application of the conduct anal-
ysis approach are likely to help courts strike a proper balance be-
tween the competing principles underlying the question of waiver
of the attorney-client privilege. On the one hand, by recognizing
the privilege, the courts promote trust and encourage open com-
munication between the attorney and his client." On the other
54. In addition to the problems presented by disclosure of the document in question,
the attorney must also consider the possibility that, if the court finds a waiver, the scope of
the waiver may extend to related privileged documents not yet disclosed. See, e.g., Weil v.
Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 & n.14 (9th Cir.
1981). The problems associated with the scope of the waiver make it even more important
that an attorney be able to predict with some accuracy the court's ruling on the waiver
question.
55. E.g., Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Assoc., 470 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (finding that "the privilege was conclusively waived"). In this regard, however,
the Ocean Transportation decision is a model exception. See supra notes 35-41 and accom-
panying text.
56. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of the attor-
ney-client privilege:
The desirability of protecting confidential communications between attorney
and client as a matter of public policy is too well known and has been too often
recognized by text-books and courts to need extended comment now. If such
communications were required to be made the subject of examination and publi-
cation, such enactment would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice
and assistance.
United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (citations omitted).
See also Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Timmons, 61 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. 1952) (confidential
relationship of attorney and client is indispensable to the administration of justice and
should not be lightly brushed aside). Courts continue to recognize the privilege as essential
to the protection of the client's legal rights. See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). Indeed, one court has suggested that the privilege may
have constitutional underpinnings. See Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32 n.36 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (citation omitted). The importance of the privilege stems from th- fact that it is
"designed not only to protect the individual client who may assert the privilege but also to
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hand, the privilege often blocks access to relevant, highly probative
evidence, thereby impeding the truth-seeking process. A court
must balance these factors in determining whether a party has
waived the attorney-client privilege.5 8 Too often, however, courts
that invoke the strict responsibility standard recognize only the
privilege's adverse impact on gathering evidence without acknowl-
edging its invaluable contribution to the attorney-client relation-
ship.59 , Consequently, the general rule that the privilege should be
construed narrowly" overly influences courts, and result in inade-
quate consideration of the circumstances of the disclosure. By fo-
cusing the court's inquiry on three specific criteria, the conduct
analysis approach helps prevent undue reliance on general rules of
construction." For these reasons, the conduct analysis is the pref-
erable approach to the issue of implied waiver through inadvertent
disclosure.
III. RECOMMENDED RESPONSE OF LAWYERS TO INADVERTENT
DISCLOSURE
Because the courts' focus under the conduct analysis approach
promote free and open communication between clients and attorneys in all matters." Garner
v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
57. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
58. See United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("The principle
of waiver by implication as a qualification on the attorney/client privilege 'should not be
applied without reference both to the objectives of the privilege and the qualification.' ")
(quoting IBM v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968)). See also Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d at 1102 (the interests served by the privilege "should properly be
taken into account in any decision on the privilege")..
59. See, e.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18
(9th Cir. 1981).
60. According to Wigmore, the attorney-client privilege should be strictly construed be-
cause it is "an obstacle to the investigation of the truth." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (rev. ed. 1961). Nearly every circuit has expressly adopted
Wigmore's admonition. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir.
1984); United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum, 697 F.2d 277, 278 (10th Cir. 1983); Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Re-
search & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981); Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation,
599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 562-63 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 952 (1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
867 (1973); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
976 (1964).
61. See, e.g., Donovan, No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 7-8 ("accepting that the attorney-
client privilege does serve important and salutary objectives despite the fact that it impedes
access to information, there is no justification for straining to find that the privilege was
'waived' [through inadvertent disclosure]").
19851
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
and strict responsibility standards are so similar in practice,62 a
lawyer's approach to the problem of inadvertent disclosure of a
privileged document should be the same regardless of the jurisdic-
tion. Courts generally examine both the precautions taken to pre-
vent disclosure and the remedial steps taken to minimize exposure
once the disclosure has occurred. Lawyers, therefore, must take ap-
propriate actions both before and after disclosure.
A lawyer can take several precautionary steps to reduce the
likelihood that a court will find an implied waiver in the event in-
advertent disclosure occurs. First, counsel should separate all privi-
leged documents from nonprivileged matter, mark privileged docu-
ments as such, and identify them on a list that contains all
privileged matter.63 If these steps are taken for each privileged
document, counsel should be able to demonstrate that he recog-
nized and attempted to assert the privilege before the inadvertent
disclosure occurred.
Once the court is satisfied that counsel took appropriate pre-
cautionary measures, its focus then shifts to post-disclosure con-
duct. Counsel's objective is to act swiftly to eliminate all doubt
concerning whether the disclosure was truly inadvertent.64 Counsel
must also prevent any use or exposure of the document that would
make it impossible to cure disclosure through return of the docu-
ment. 5 These goals can be accomplished through a series of ac-
tions performed in rapid succession.
First, as soon as the disclosure is brought to his attention,
counsel should unequivocally reassert the privilege. Next, counsel
should take appropriate remedial steps to ensure that the breach
of confidence occasioned by the inadvertent disclosure is kept to a
minimum. The most expedient procedure is simply to ask that the
document be returned.66 If this fails, counsel should move for a
62. See supra text accompanying notes 31-48.
63. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
64. See In re Grand" Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672, 675
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979) (noting that because counsel did not immedi-
ately reassert the privilege, "the disclosure cannot be viewed as having been inadvertent in
all respects"); see also Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647
F.2d 18, 25 n.13 (9th Cir. 1981) (where "the privileged communication is voluntarily dis-
closed without objection by the asserting party's counsel. . . it may be unnecessary to look
beyond the objective fact of disclosure in ruling on the question of waiver").
65. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672, 675
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
66. While this route appears unlikely to succeed, it should be noted that in Ocean




protective order. This motion should request that the court issue
an order that requires opposing counsel to return the document
and all copies of the document, and prevents the opposing party
from disclosing the contents of the document or using the docu-
ment at trial."8 At the time he files the motion, counsel should at-
tempt to enter into an agreement with opposing counsel to the ef-
fect that the document will not be disclosed to anyone while
counsel's motion for a protective order is pending. This approach
promotes judicial economy because it spares the court needless in-
volvement in an emergency hearing. In some cases, however, such
an agreement may not be attainable or practicable, and in those
instances, counsel should seek an emergency protective order to
seal the document until the court rules on the implied waiver
issue.69
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts have not agreed on the proper approach to the is-
sue of implied waiver through inadvertent disclosure. Although the
factors considered by the courts are somewhat uniform in practice,
the conduct analysis approach provides a test that is more under-
standable and easier to apply than the strict responsibility stan-
dard. Regardless of the approach employed by the courts, however,
counsel in all jurisdictions should take appropriate precautions to
prevent disclosure and act swiftly to reassert the privilege and se-
cure the privileged document's return if inadvertent disclosure
occurs.
67. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for a protective
order.
68. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Donovan, No. 78-C-4075, slip op. at 3-4.
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